Private Sector Involvement in Water Services: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evidence by García-Valiñas, Maria A. et al.
 TSE-590 
 “Private Sector Involvement in Water Services: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evidence”   Maria A. Garcia Valiñas, Francisco Gonzalez Gomez,  Javier Suarez Pandiello, Vera Zaporozhets 
Juillet 2015 
Private Sector Involvement in Water Services:
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evidence.
Mar´ıa A. Garc´ıa Valin˜as
Francisco Gonza´lez Go´mez
Javier Sua´rez Pandiello
Vera Zaporozhets
Abstract
Water services management has become a key issue as urban water supply is con-
sidered a service of general interest in the European Union (EU, 2001). In this context,
public-private partnerships (PPP) have emerged as a usual way of local water services
provision. This paper contributes to analyze the effects and consequences of PPP in
the management of water resources. First of all, we develop a theoretical framework to
show the effects of water services contracting-out on water prices. Second, we estimate
the model using a sample of Spanish municipal water services recently privatized. Our
findings support that, in a context of limited resources, local governments are using
public-private partnerships in order to get additional fundings to reduce their indebt-
ness levels. Moreover, the fact of setting a high reservation price as a way to guarantee
a minimum amount of resources has had consequences in terms of water price increases
after water services privatization.
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1 Introduction
Supplying public goods and services while achieving quality requirements is a challenge
in both developed and developing countries. In this respect, public-private partnerships
(PPPs) have strongly emerged as a way of collaboration. According to Me´nard (2013),
PPPs are basically a contractual approach to the delivery of infrastructures, goods and
services traditionally provided by the public sector or by private operators subject to tight
command-and-control regulation, such as public utilities.
In general, PPPs have been usually justified by efficiency reasons (Bel and Fageda, 2007;
Bel et al., 2010). So, a key aim consists of avoiding the negative effects of a bureaucratic
environment (Rodr´ıguez and Sua´rez-Pandiello, 2003). Moreover, PPPs give to public ad-
ministrations the possibility to create incentives that encourage private operators to invest,
in order to control costs but at the same time improve quality and quantity standards. How-
ever, on top of this argument, there could be other reasons to begin a process of privatization
for the management of several public services. These could be ideological (supporting a con-
servative idea about the need of limiting the size of the public sector) or more pragmatic
(obtaining additional resources to face eventual situations of financial stress).
The management of local water services using PPP has become popular in the last
decades (World Bank, 2006). Water is a merit good that has important implications in eco-
nomic, social and environmental dimensions (OECD, 2003). Moreover, urban water supply
is considered a service of general interest in the European Union (EU, 2001).
The literature has suggested several reasons that lead local governments to privatize wa-
ter services (Gonza´lez-Go´mez and Garc´ıa-Rubio, 2008). Political, financial and operational
factors have influence on the privatization decision. Focusing on some of them, several stud-
ies have found that the fragile financial situation of several municipalities has also been a
key factor in the decision to externalize urban water services (Gonza´lez-Go´mez et al., 2011).
Thus, privatization has been a source of significant revenue for local governments. On the
other hand, local governments could try to get improvements in the management of water
services, especially under complex operational environments.
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Additionally, several studies have investigated some consequences of PPPs schemes in wa-
ter sector, considering different dimensions, as quality (Shaoul, 1997; Lobina and Hall, 2000;
Wallsten and Kosec, 2008), efficiency (Gonza´lez-Go´mez and Garc´ıa-Rubio, 2008; Picazo-
Tadeo et al., 2009a,b) and prices (Hall and Lobina, 2004; Lobina, 2005; Garcia et al., 2005;
Chong et al., 2006; Carpentier et al., 2006; Mart´ınez-Espin˜eira et al., 2009; Ruester and
Zschille, 2010; Garc´ıa-Valin˜as et al., 2013).
However, the previous literature has neglected some characteristics of privatization pro-
cesses, which can be significant key-drivers to explain price variations. This research develops
a theoretical auctioning model in which reservation price set by local authorities has a sig-
nificant impact on water prices. An empirical analysis has also been carried out in order to
test this hypothesis. Financial stress under economic crisis has also been considered as an
additional factor in this framework.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the institutional water
sector framework in Spain. In Section 3 we develop a theoretical model to explain PPPs and
auctioning in the water sector, assuming profit maximization in the case of private operator,
and the presence of a vote-maximizing local government. Section 4, based on a database of
Spanish municipal water services recently privatized, we test the effects of PPPs on several
key variables. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the most significant findings and future
extensions of this research.
2 Water Sector in Spain: PPP schemes
The legal framework in Spain, Law 7/1985 on the Regulation of Local Government Terms
and Conditions and Law 57/2003 on Local Government Modernization Measures, establishes
that local governments are responsible for guaranteeing the urban water service, but may
choose how it should be managed and the legal regime for provision. The laws mentioned
above and Royal Decree 2/2000 establish the legal regimes for the provision of municipal
services. The local government may choose between either managing the service in-house
or outsource it to an external company. In case of externalization, management may be
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transferred either to a public company or privatized. In the latter case, the management
of the service may be either fully privatized, contractual PPP, or partially privatised to
a mixed company, institutionalised PPP. It is worth highlighting that Spanish legislation
only contemplates privatizing the management of the service, as the infrastructure remains
public property. Statistics show that there has been a progressive process of water services
privatization from the 80s in Spain. In 2008 private companies supplied 46% of the Spanish
population (AEAS, 2010). Additionally, it should be noted that the Spanish market is highly
concentrated: Aqualia and Aguas de Barcelona are the two main private operators.
Contractual public-private partnerships are the most widespread form of privatizing pub-
lic services in Spain. In 2008 33% of Spanish population was served by fully private companies
(AEAS, 2010). Concessions take the form of contract whereby the local government entrusts
an individual or corporation (legal entity) with the management, but still owns the service.
They are awarded following a public tender and for a limited amount of time. In the case of
water supply companies, contracts that involve building infrastructures and operating the
service must be no longer than fifty years, while those that only imply running the service
have a twenty-five-year limit. At the end of the contract, local governments must again
decide how they wish the service to be managed for a new period.
An alternative for the private sector to participate in the management of the urban
water service is the creation of institutionalized PPPs (Bel and Warner, 2008; Gonza´lez-
Go´mez et al., 2011), whereby capital is shared between the private and public sector. In
such companies, local government participation is high enough to guarantee that public
objectives will be accomplished successfully. In 2008, those entities served to 13% of Spanish
population (AEAS, 2010). This form of management makes it possible to combine public
interests such as universal access and quality standards with the industry know-how of
private management. In this sense, the private partner is mainly responsible for managing
these companies, while the political decisions are made by the public partner. Da Cruz and
Marques (2012) have nonetheless pointed out that, in spite of the theoretical advantages of
institutionalized PPPs, the empirical evidence for the case of the Portuguese water service
shows that the complexity involved in their management usually leads to a poor protection
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of the public interest. In line with those results and using a sample of big-medium size cities
in Spain, Garc´ıa-Valin˜as et al. (2013) found that mixed companies set higher prices that
other kind of entities. [What about selection bias? Carpentier]
Anyway, when local governments decide to let private initiative come into the manage-
ment of water services, they might organize an auction with some requirements to operators
in order to attend to the competition. Those specifications include, among others, a minimum
entrance and/or annual fees, and a certain level of investment during the concession period.
Private operators might submit a bid trying to improve those minimum requirements. Once
offers are received, local governments choose a winner based on several criteria.
In this situation, it is clear that the minimum requirements included in the initial bidding
conditions should reveal the intention of local governments when they decide to privatize.
Thus, they can fix a high minimum fee and (or) investments, in order to maximize the
revenues from privatization. However, if the minimum requirements are not so high, other
kind of objectives could emerge. Hence, the way the auction is organized could determine
the final result of privatization process, in terms of price and quality. In this paper, we
analyze this hypothesis from both a theoretical and empirical point of view.
3 The Model
Consider a municipality with M agents. Each agent inelastically consumes one unit of tap
water. The municipality considers whether or not to privatize the supply of tap water. The
privatization occurs through a first-price sealed-bid auction.
There are N potential suppliers of tap water, indexed by i. Firm i wins the auction
if her bid, bi, is higher than the other bids and if it exceeds the municipality’s reservation
price r. Bidder i faces cost ci to supply tap water. The cost ci is private information of
Firm i. The costs ci are independently drawn from distribution with c.d.f. F . Its support is
[0, ω]. Function F admits a continuous density function f ≡ F ′. The hazard rate function
associated with the distribution F is defined as F (c)
f(c)
, and we assume that it is increasing in
c.
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After the auction, the winning bidder must decide on how much to invest to improve
the supply of water. This investment is denoted by I. The municipality, after observing I,
decides on the unit price p that the water company is allowed to charge. We assume that
p = φs(I), where s describes a state of nature and where φs is increasing and concave with
φs(0) = 0.1 To avoid confusion, we consider the following sequencing of events:
1. State s is publicly observed.
2. The municipality chooses the reservation price r. Bidder i learns her cost ci.
3. All bidders—after observing r—participate in a first-price auction.
4. The winning bidder chooses her investment level I.
5. The municipal council observes I and sets p.
As usual this game is solved by backward induction. At time 3, the winning firm faces
the following problem:
max
I
φs(I)M − I − ci.
As φs is concave, there exists a unique value of I which maximizes her profits. The equilib-
rium investment level is calculated as
I =
(
dφs
dI
)−1(
1
M
)
. (1)
Obviously, I depends on whether or not the local government needs to compromise with
members of the opposition. To avoid cumbersome notations, in what follows we drop the
superscript s to define the equilibrium price and profit.
The equilibrium post-privatization price of water is then:
p = φ(I). (2)
1For example, s ∈ {maj,min}. If s = maj, the municipal government has a majority in the municipal
council. If s = min, the municipal government must compromise with the opposition in the municipal council
in order to increase the price of water.
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Let pi(c) denote the equilibrium profits (excluding her bid) made by the winning firm.
Formally,
pi(c) = φ(I)M − I − c,
where equilibrium investment level is defined in (1). We assume that pi(0) > 0. This
assumption is natural: If pi(0) were negative, a bidder with zero costs who won the auction
after bidding zero would still face losses. No bidder would be interested to participate in
such an auction.
All bidders are assumed to bid according to a symmetric, decreasing and differentiable
bidding function β : [0, ω]→ <+. Let
c¯ ≡ φ(I)M − I − r, (3)
where equilibrium investment level is defined in (1). Intuitively, a bidder with cost c¯ who
pays the reservation price r gets zero profits. Any bidder with cost c > c¯ thus drops out of
the auction. Formally, any strategy which prescribes her to bid above r is dominated. Now
suppose bidder i’s cost ci is less than c¯, i.e. that pM − I − r − ci > 0. Suppose there exists
an equilibrium in which she is supposed to bid less than r. In this candidate equilibrium,
she never wins the auction and she therefore gets zero. She can, however, profitably deviate
by bidding r + : With positive probability she then wins the good and receives a payoff
equal to φ(I)M − I − r− ci −  > 0. Hence, in any candidate equilibrium, β(c¯) = r. A unit
increase in the reservation price r thus leads to a unit decrease in the types that drop out of
the auction.
We assume that pmajM − Imaj − ω = 0. In words, the assumption states that if ci = ω
and if bidder i wins her tract after bidding zero, she gets zero in state s = maj. It is thus
without loss of generality to assume that ci ≤ ω: A bidder with a cost ci > ω would never
participate in the auction, not even if r = 0 and if s = maj.
Let Y1 denote the lowest cost realization among the remaining N − 1 bidders. Formally,
Y1 ≡ minj 6=i{cj}. Let G(c) ≡ Pr(Y1 < c) denote the probability that the lowest cost of the
N − 1 other bidders is less than c and g(c) is the corresponding density function2. Following
2G(c)=1− [1− F (c)]N−1 .
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Krishna (2009) the proposition below summarizes equilibrium bidding strategies at time
three.
Proposition 1
β(c) =
 0 if c > c¯,1
1−G(c)
[∫ c¯
c
pi(x)g(x)dx+ [1−G(c¯)]r
]
if c < c¯
(4)
and c¯ is given by (3).
We now analyze the municipality’s maximization problem. Municipality chooses r to
maximize its ex ante expected revenue. Our most important result, which describes the
equilibrium reservation price, is summarized below.
Lemma
In equilibrium,
r =
F
f
(φ(I)M − I − r) . (5)
The equilibrium reservation price is uniquely defined since the hazard rate function is
increasing.
We now analyze some comparative static results of our model.
Recall, that the equilibrium quantities are defined through the following system of equa-
tions:
r =
F
f
(
max
I
φs(I)M − I − r
)
p = φ
((
dφs
dI
)−1(
1
M
))
We make additional assumptions on function φs: for all I, ∂φ
s
∂I
is increasing with s. This
assumption ensures that the winning firm has more incentives to invest when the state is
more favorable for the local government. The assumption also implies that φs1(I) < φs2(I)
for s1 < s2 whenever I > 0. In case s ∈ {maj,min} the condition translates to ∂φmin∂I < ∂φ
maj
∂I
,
which ensures higher investments for the winning firm when the local government does not
need to compromise with the local opposition parties.
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From the model we get the following results.
1. As ∂φ
s
∂I
increases the equilibrium price p and the reservation price r increase.
2. As F
f
increases r increases and p does not change.
3. As M increases both r and p increase.
COULD YOU WRITE HERE SOME PARAGRAPHS TO CONNECT THIS PART
WITH THE EMPIRICAL PART? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN P AND R, THE
RELATION WITH POLITICAL VARIABLES, ETC ETC
4 Empirical evidence
In order to test some of the findings showed in the previous section, we estimate a simple
model using a data base of Spanish municipalities recently privatized, with a population
size lower than 50.000 inhabitants. In particular, we analyze the influence of some auction
conditions and environmental factors on water prices.
4.1 Data
Data on the auctioning terms and conditions are taken from several public websites which
contain all the details on the privatization process. Law 30/2007 on Public Sector Con-
tracts compels public authorities to upload to a public website all the documents linked to
the public contracting processes from April 2008. Big-medium municipalities use to have
a specific link in its own webpage that contains all the information. However, information
on small municipalities contracting-out is centralized in a website managed by a regional
public authority. Additionally, we have got information on water infrastructure quality from
a survey on local infrastructures conducted periodically by the Ministry of Public Admin-
istration. Every 5 years, municipalities smaller than 50.000 inhabitants are interviewed in
order to get exhaustive information on local public assets in terms of quantity and quality.
The National Institute of Statistics (INE) elaborates statistics related to population, and
political and public finance variables were taken from the Ministry of Economics and Public
Administration webpage.
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4.2 Econometric Analysis
Hereafter, we estimate the following equation system:
difp = f1(r, pop, bpipeb,majority, difv) (6)
r = f2(debtb)
difv = f3(incbill).
Our dependent variable (difv) is showing the difference between prices before and after
privatization. From an empirical point of view, the construction of this variable in rela-
tive terms is more interesting, since it is showing how privatization process leads to price
variations. As independent variables, we include the population (pop), and two political
variables, showing the presence of strong majority governments in the year of privatization
(majority), and a variable representative of the electoral support of local government along
time (difv). Unfortunately, it was not possible to get information on the final investment.
So we finally include a water services infrastructure quality index, as a way to approach
future investments (bpipeb).
At the same time, we consider that r is a function of the financial situation of the
local incumbent (debtb). In this respect, we are also testing if local governments are using
privatization processes to get extra-funding and pay public debt off. We also consider that
the causality relationship in the case of difv is not clear. That fact means that the electoral
support can allow to increase prices, but that support can also be influenced by privatization
outcomes. Thus, we specify an additional equation where the electoral support depends on
the relative increase of water bill after water services privatization (incbill). Appendix B
includes further details about variables that we use in our empirical analysis [variable cons
is not described].
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Tables 1 and 2 shows some summary statistics. In Table 1, the representative municipal-
ity is a small entity around 8.200 inhabitants, with financial problems and around 25% of
its pipes in bad conditions. On average, the difference between monthly water bill after and
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before privatization represents 2.3 Euros (in average, around 30% increase on monthly water
bill). Regarding political variables, we observe that majority governments during the priva-
tization, that loose votes in the elections after privatization. Additionally, in the majority
of municipalities, there are not minimum investment requirements included in the bid terms
and conditions. That evidence makes easier to assume that the municipality has focused
basically on the revenues (?).
Table 2 presents average figures by municipality size. The small sample size make not
possible to show independent estimates. Anyway, it is interesting to observe the differences
among the three groups of municipalities defined 3. Although the relation is not linear, the
most significant bill increases (higher than 2 euros) are registered in small municipalities
(lower than 20,000 inhabitants). Additionally, the percentage of pipes in bad conditions
is higher in the block from 5,001 to 20,000 inhabitants, which presents the higher price
increases after privatization. The percentage of strong majorities during the privatization is
much higher in the smaller municipalities (up to 5,000 inhabitants). In addition, it decreases
substantially with municipality size. Municipalities between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants
suffer the most important reduction in the electoral support after privatization. Finally it is
in this population block where the reservation price is higher in relative terms. It represents
around 57% of the local debt.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 presents the main results. First of all, OLS model is applied to a basic model with
no political variables (m0). The remaining models (m1,m2, m3) show estimates using three
stage least square econometric method (3SLS). Compared with OLS, this method allows
correcting endogeneity and improves efficiency. The last three models add variables in a
sequential way, in order to carry out sensitivity analysis. Model m3 presents the results for
the whole equation system in (6).
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The empirical analysis shows a positive and strongly significant relationship between the
3Those three groups are based on population blocks at the Spanish Law 7/1985 regulating the Basis of
Local Regime
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reservation price and the price increase after the privatization. Moreover, local governments
with higher financial problems set higher reservation prices in the auction. Thus, local
public debt is emerging as a determinant of the reservation price, assuring higher revenues
to improve municipal financial situation. The setting of higher reservation prices could also
lead to reduce competition at the bidding process, because only the big private operators
would participate. In this respect, the competition emerge as a significant issue to improve
private firms behavior (Wallsten and Kosec, 2008; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009a,b; Garc´ıa-
Valin˜as et al., 2013).
Water infrastructures in bad conditions require higher investments, so price increases after
the privatization are higher. In bigger municipalities, price increase is lower. This finding
makes sense, since municipality size is directly linked to the costs of water services (Garc´ıa-
Valin˜as et al., 2013). Regarding political variables, we have found higher price increases
linked to majority governments. Controlling for endogeneity, the relationship between the
price increase after privatization and the political support is slightly significant and positive.
That probably means that in those cities where there is a strong political support, local
governments have higher probability to accept price increases after privatization. However,
it seems that water services are not the key issue which lead parties to loss/gain votes. So,
political support on time depends on different factors and local management dimensions,
and not exclusively on water services management.
5 Concluding remarks
A growing interest on the analysis of causes and consequences of PPP schemes in public
services management can be found in economic literature along the last years. These models
have been encouraged by two main reasons: Firstly, as a voluntary way to reach efficiency
goals and, alternatively, as a more pragmatic manner (less orthodox) to cover financial gaps
between the needs of expenditure and the current tax resources in moments of fiscal stress
for local governments.
With this article we contribute to this debate. Thus, we provide some theoretical back-
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ground and interesting findings in the water sector. We have presented a stylized theoretical
model in order to characterize the relevant conditions of the process throughout an auction.
The reservation price, the need for some minimum investment requirements, the costs or
provision and the price structures are important factors to take into account. The model as-
sumes that private operator tries to maximize their profits and considers some public choice
constraints linked to the governance of the involved public administration.
Afterwards, we have tested the effects of PPPs on several key variables. We use a database
of Spanish low and medium-size municipalities where water management was recently priva-
tized. A significant contribution of this paper is related to the current public sector financial
situation. Thus, our first conclusion is that local governments are using public-private part-
nerships in order to get additional funding to reduce their indebtness levels. Economic crisis
emerges as a key-driver of water services privatization. Moreover, the fact of setting a high
reservation price as a way to guarantee a minimum amount of resources has had consequences
in terms of water price increases after the privatization processes. our second conclusion is
that political issues are also significant, in the sense that majority governments allow private
operators to set higher water prices after the privatization.
An overview of the last two results should alert us about the implications of the pri-
vatization process in terms of public choice on the future sustainability of public finances.
Thus, the opportunistic use of privatization processes, from a relatively comfortable political
position could lead to undesirable effects. A government supported by a large majority could
decide to switch from public to private management for a long period of time, by request-
ing a high initial fee (reservation price). In the short term, this government could allocate
the amount collected to reduce past debts or to extend or improve other services different
from the privatized. However, our results suggest that this will have relevant effects on the
privatized utility, without any a priori guarantee to get proportional improvements in the
quality of the service (prices will tend to grow more so greater has been the reservation price,
because the private operator would want recover its original investment).
Although the externalization processes occurred in Spain along the last years are yet very
recent and therefore it is too early to judge their outcomes in perspective, we have provided
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some useful findings. Definitively, it is therefore highly important that these privatization
processes are conducted with the greatest transparency. So, this contribution allows enhanc-
ing the knowledge on the management of this significant merit good.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
Following Krishna (2009) let us assume that all firms but firm 1 follow the strategy
β(c) ≡ β provided in (4). We would like to show that in this case it will be optimal for
firm 1 to follow β as well. We denote by z the cost for which b is the equilibrium bid, i.e.,
β(z) = b. Then firm 1’s expected payoff from bidding β(z) when his cost is c is calculated
as follows:
Π(b, c) = [1−G(z)] [pi(c)− β(z)]
= [1−G(z)]pi(c)−
∫ c
z
pi(x)g(x)dx− [1−G(c)] pi(c).
As a result of integration by parts one can get that:
−
∫ c
z
pi(x)g(x)dx =
∫ c
z
pi(x)d(1−G(x))
= [1−G(x)]pi(x) |cz +
∫ c
z
[1−G(x)] dx.
Therefore,
Π(b, c) = [1−G(z)] [pi(c)− pi(z)] +
∫ c
z
[1−G(x)] dx
= [1−G(z)] [z − c]−
∫ c
z
[1−G(x)] dx.
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We thus can obtain the difference in expected payoffs when firm 1 bids β(c), where c is
its true cost, as compared when it bids b = β(z):
Π(β(c), c)− Π(β(z), c) = [1−G(z)] (c− z)−
∫ c
z
[1−G(x)] dx. (7)
From the mean-value theorem:∫ c
z
[1−G(x)] dx = [1−G(y)] (c− z) ,
where y ∈ (z, x) for x ≥ z and y ∈ (z, x) for z ≥ x. Then, (7) becomes:
Π(β(c), c)− Π(β(z), c) = (c− z) [G(y)−G(z)] .
Since the cumulative distribution function G is non-decreasing the last expression is non-
negative regardless of whether z ≥ x or x ≥ z.
Proof of Lemma 1
As there is a one-to-one relationship between r and c¯, it is without loss of generality to
assume that she chooses c¯ instead of r. We assume that she chooses c¯ to maximize revenues.
The expected payment of a bidder is β(c) [1−G(c)], and from (4) it reduces to:
c¯∫
c
pi(x)g(x)dx+ [1−G(c¯)]pi(c¯).
Then a bidder’s ex ante expected payoff is:
c¯∫
0
c¯∫
c
pi(x)g(x)dxf(c)dc+
c¯∫
0
[1−G(c¯)]pi(c¯)f(x)dx. (8)
Applying integration by parts one can rewrite the double integral in (8) as:
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c¯∫
0
c¯∫
c
pi(x)g(x)dxf(c)dc =
c¯∫
c
pi(x)g(x)dxF (c) |c¯0 +
c¯∫
0
F (c)pi(c)g(c)dc
=
c¯∫
0
F (c)pi(c)g(c)dc.
Thus, (8) becomes:
F (c¯) [1−G(c¯)] pi(c¯) +
c¯∫
0
F (c)pi(c)g(c)dc.
Without loss of generality, we assume that if the auction fails, i.e., ci > c¯ for all i, the
municipality obtains 0. Then, the overall expected payoff of the municipality from setting a
reservation price is:
NF (c¯) [1−G(c¯)]pi(c¯) +N
c¯∫
0
F (c)pi(c)g(c)dc. (9)
. As there is a one-to-one relationship between r and c¯, it is without loss of generality to
assume that the municipality chooses c¯ instead of r to maximize its overall expected payoff
(9).
Taking into account the fact that
G(x) = 1− [1− F (x)]N−1 ,
the derivative of (9) with respect to c¯ is:
N (1−G(c¯)) (pi(c¯)f(c¯)− F (c¯)) ,
and the result follows.
Appendix B: Variables definition
difp: Difference between total bill after and before privatization, corresponding to an average
consumption of 15 cubic meter per month (in Euros per cubic meter).
17
r: Reservation price (in thousands of Euros).
pop: Population of the municipality in 2011 (in thousands of people).
bpipeb: Percentage of pipes in bad conditions in 2005 (in percentages).
majority: Dummy which takes value 1 if there was a majority government the year of pri-
vatization.
difv: Difference between the percentage of votes got by the party governing in the moment
of privatization, after and before the privatization (in percentages).
debtb: Local debt the year before privatization (in thousands of Euros).
incbill: Total bill growth rate (in percentages).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
difp 2.318 3.141 -0.820 14.632 64
r 1,603.149 1,954.972 0 8,000 64
pop 8.262 9.061 0.439 44.737 64
bpipeb 24.404 33.718 0 100 61
majority 0.688 0.467 0 1 64
difv -2.16 10.157 -27.24 22.91 64
debtb 2,831.526 3,827.958 0 15,247 57
incbill 0.332 0.506 -0.07 2.386 64
22
Table 2: Statistics by municipality size
pop difp r bpipeb majority difv debtb incbill
< 5,000 2.09 462.09 22.77 0.83 -1.51 908.75 0.32
5,001-20,000 2.91 2,272.41 27.67 0.57 -1.38 4,044.68 0.40
20,000-50,000 1.34 5,693.86 22.24 0.33 -8.93 14,444.67 0.16
Total 2.32 1,603.15 24.40 0.69 -2.16 2,831.53 0.33
23
Table 3: Estimates
m0 m1 m2 m3
r .001 .029*** .041*** .032***
(.000) (.007) (.010) (.008)
pop -.197 -5.733*** -7.985*** -5.810***
(.118) (1.428) (1.977) (1.602)
bpipeb .022 .112*** .136*** .202***
(.013) (.032) (.039) (.060)
majority 5.678* 10.160*
(2.591) (4.395)
difv 1.841*
(.872)
cons 1.877** -1.410 -7.115* -11.325**
(.690) (1.337) (2.847) (4.152)
r
debtb .323*** .323*** .337***
(.046) (.046) (.044)
cons 592.012** 592.012** 550.805*
(221.036) (221.036) (218.195)
difv
incbill -2.784
(2.545)
constant -.981
(1.673)
N 54 54 54 54
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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